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Judicial Restoration of Rights as an Auxiliary to the
Pardon Power
I. Introduction
Much of the current conversation on presidential clemency
power focuses on its potential to reduce mass incarceration
through the commutation of prison sentences.1 Given the
quintupling of the federal prison population over the last
three decades or so,2 with tens of thousands of individuals
currently serving unnecessarily and disproportionately long
sentences,3 this emphasis is born of justifiable urgency. Of
note, among President Obama’s 1,927 acts of executive
clemency, 1,715 were commutations.4
But as a large body of research demonstrates, a prison
sentence is but one—and sometimes not even the worst—
of the cascading consequences of a criminal conviction.
Individuals with a criminal conviction face an ever-growing
panoply of mandated restrictions and exclusions that touch
every facet of their lives. These range from the intimate,
such as limiting where and with whom the person can live;
to the professional, including loss of licensure or debar-
ment; to civic losses like voting rights; and, in the context of
noncitizens, to potential banishment through deportation.5
Along with these formal restrictions is an array of informal
consequences flowing from the stigma of conviction, which
can similarly impact housing and employment opportuni-
ties, but can also—less visibly and more perniciously—
create social isolation and psychological damage for the
individual and their family, an effect with intergenerational
implications.6 Criminal convictions have consequences for
the individual’s community, too—including over-policing,
under-protection, and disenfranchisement.7 Moreover, as
a recent study by the Brennan Center reveals, the cumula-
tive economic impact of a criminal conviction—estimated
at over $370 billion annually—has widened national eco-
nomic and racial inequalities.8
The number of people impacted by the collateral con-
sequences of criminal convictions far exceeds the number
of people currently behind bars. Tens of millions of people
in the United States have been convicted of a crime.9 The
federal system, in the last fifteen years alone, sentenced
over 1.1 million defendants.10 Yet, unlike in state systems,
there is no formalized procedure at the federal level for the
sealing of criminal records or for the restoration of rights
following a period of productive and arrest-free living.11
Thus, “mass conviction,”12 as Gabriel Chin has
described this phenomenon—that one-third of the U.S.
adult population has a criminal record—spotlights anew
the “pardon” aspect of the president’s clemency power. A
pardon, at its heart, restores an individual’s citizenship
rights and status. Although sometimes granted as an
exoneration, a pardon has traditionally and historically been
viewed as an act of forgiveness and an affirmation that the
individual is rehabilitated and deserves to rejoin society as
a fully participating member.13
Needless to say, no presidential administration could
review, in an individualized manner, all pardon applica-
tions from even a fraction of the population with federal
convictions.14 But our federal judicial system has a battalion
of judges, supported by thousands of judicial law clerks,
probation officers, prosecutors, and federal defenders, to
implement a broad and systematic scheme to restore rights
to those who can demonstrate their rehabilitation. Judges
are uniquely situated to analyze these requests compre-
hensively. For one thing, in most cases, they will know the
petitioner and their case well. They have the expertise and
infrastructure to subject any assertions to a rigorous
examination, including adversarial testing. Moreover, with
recent changes wrought by Congress, the Supreme Court,
and the Sentencing Commission, our federal court system
has proved its capacity to process systematically and effi-
ciently thousands of applications for a “second look” at
previously imposed sentences, including an evaluation of
the applicant’s post-sentence conduct.15
It is time that Congress—through legislation like the
proposed RE-ENTER Act or its equivalent16—harnesses the
federal judicial system to restore rights to the vast number
of people whose federal criminal convictions have con-
signed them to a second-class status.
Part II of this essay describes the underpinnings of the
president’s Article II pardon power, highlighting its goal of
establishing a path to forgiveness and restoration—in
Alexander Hamilton’s words, to mitigate the impact of
“unfortunate guilt.”17 Part III summarizes the current
research on the far-reaching and devastating noncustodial
consequences of criminal convictions, which impact not
just the individuals with convictions, but their families and
communities and, given the extent of “mass conviction,”
the country at large. This research reveals the pressing need
for a robust use of executive pardon power, or, better yet,
something more far-reaching, to restore rights and status to
those with criminal convictions. Part IV outlines how one
scalable auxiliary to presidential pardon power is
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a legislative scheme that harnesses the federal court system
to conduct individualized reviews and adjudications of
petitions for the restoration of rights. The essay’s Conclu-
sion states that in the digital age, where nothing can be truly
forgotten, judicial certifications of rehabilitation, coupled
with clear prohibitions on considering criminal records, are
the most effective way to address the profound collateral
consequences of criminal convictions.
II. The Pardon Power as Mitigating “Unfortunate Guilt”
Presidential pardon power—whether in the form at issue in
this essay (a pardon that restores the individual to the civil
status they enjoyed prior to conviction) or as amnesty,
commutation, or reprieve—has its origins in English his-
tory as the “prerogative of mercy.”18 Despite egregious
abuses, the pardon power not only survived through the
colonial period but was incorporated into the U.S. Consti-
tution with few limitations.19 Other than in cases of
impeachment, non-federal crimes, and crimes not yet
committed, the pardon power is “plenary,”20 subject only to
the discretion of the president.21
Why did our Founders decide to give this level of
expansive power to one individual? The issue was hotly
contested. One of the main objections was to its
“unqualified” power, which necessarily made it applicable
in cases of treason.22 These objections were addressed in
part by the addition of an impeachment limitation, but also
by reference to the humanistic principles underlying the
pardon power. To condition the pardon power on the con-
sent of the U.S. Senate would dilute its potential for mercy
because “a single [person]” would be more receptive to
“those motives which might plead for a mitigation of the
rigor of the law.”23 The plenary nature of the power was
justified by the values of “humanity and good policy;”
advice and consent procedures were not implemented, to
ensure that the president empathized with the convicted
person as a “fellow-creature” when considering clemency.24
The pardon power would be “the ‘private . . . act’ of the
executive magistrate,”25 specifically designed to be a human
decision unconstrained by law.
The Supreme Court’s consideration of the pardon
power echoes this conclusion: “The plain purpose of the
broad power conferred by [the Constitution] was to allow
plenary authority in the President to ‘forgive’ the convicted
person.”26 Granting and acceptance of a pardon are
intended not to erase the underlying conduct, but to miti-
gate the consequences to a person whose guilt is
“established by judicial proceedings.”27 A pardon is “an
act of grace,” granting relief from the prospective
consequences of an offense, but not erasing the offense
itself.28 By its nature, the issuance of a pardon “carries an
imputation of guilt; acceptance [of a pardon carries] a con-
fession of it.”29
But the American concept of the pardon power goes
beyond mere mercy—it incorporates the idea that Ameri-
can justice may be unduly harsh. Even the most just crim-
inal code incorporates “necessary severity” to effectuate its
goals; this, in turn, requires “easy access to exceptions in
favor of unfortunate guilt.”30 In the typical case, a pardon is
fundamentally based not on a finding of innocence, a denial
of the underlying illegal conduct, or even a rote examina-
tion of sentencing factors. Instead, it is based on the per-
sonal circumstances of the convicted person and their
innate humanity despite “unfortunate guilt.”31
More specifically, the pardon is a recognition that laws,
even when they are just in the aggregate, may lead to unjust
outcomes in particular circumstances. While a pardon may
be issued based on miscarriages of justice or actual inno-
cence,32 the underlying theory is that a guilty person
deserves relief from some or all of the consequences of
their offense. Hamilton worried that justice would “wear
a countenance too sanguinary and cruel” if certain legally
correct but unduly harsh punishments could not be cor-
rected.33 When a legally correct but unjust conviction or
sentence is imposed, whether through overcriminalization,
overzealous prosecution, or other factors, a pardon
“releases the offender from all disabilities imposed by the
offence, and restores to [them] all [their] civil rights.”34 It is
a moral “signal that an offender has been rehabilitated” and
is ready to rejoin society as a full member, rather than
a legal signal that the conviction or sentence was incorrect.35
The justice (or lack thereof) of continuing consequences, in
the face of an offender’s innate humanity and cultivated
rehabilitation, is at the very core of pardon decisions.
III. Today’s Need for a Robust Use of Pardon Power
The pardon power was justified in 1787, in part, by refer-
ence to the “necessary severity” of the criminal legal system
(which at the time could be very brutal).36 Today’s era of
mass conviction presents not only the “necessary severity”
inherent in the enforcement of the criminal law, but a great
deal of unnecessary and unforeseen severity as well. This
disproportionate punishment—experienced predominantly
by people of color37—only enhances the need for, and the
frequent exercise of, a broad pardon power or its equivalent.
As Margaret Love summed it up: “The collateral
consequences of a criminal conviction linger long after the
sentence imposed by the court has been served, depriving
ex-offenders of the tools necessary to reestablish them-
selves as law-abiding and productive members of the free
community . . . [with] no realistic hope of satisfying their
debt to society, or regaining a place in it.”38 The
“unnecessary severity”39 of these collateral consequences—
which may be either formally imposed by the legal system
or informally driven by stigma—have implications not just
for the individual, but for their family, their community,
and, ultimately, society as a whole.
At an individual and familial level, collateral conse-
quences are often “the most severe and long-lasting effect
of conviction.”40 Formal consequences—including restric-
tions on where and with whom one can live, the loss of
licenses to drive or practice a trade, the loss of the right to
vote, deportation, and more—have been compared to “civil
death.”41 Informal consequences, including loss of
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opportunities for employment and housing, constitute
a permanent “badge of infamy,” yielding deleterious effects
on physical and mental health.42 The impact on family
members can also be devastating, with “parental incarcer-
ation putt[ing] children at a higher risk for poverty, insta-
bility, and various mental health problems.”43
Concentrations of individuals with criminal convictions
can have deep community effects too. Predictive policing
technology utilizes criminal record data, resulting in certain
neighborhoods being over-policed.44 Research also shows
that over-policed communities are simultaneously under-
protected.45 These individuals’ loss of the right to vote—
compounded by census counting of their imprisoned
community members in their counties of incarceration—
results in an outsize level of disenfranchisement.46
But the tipping point, as our nation embarks on “a whole-
of-government equity agenda” to address historic and sys-
temic inequality,47 must be the economic effect. In eco-
nomic terms, the cost of criminal convictions in the form of
lost wages rises into the hundreds of billions.48 Annual
earnings of those who serve prison sentences fall by over
one-half.49 While those convicted but not imprisoned suffer
smaller losses in earnings, the aggregate economic loss is
even higher because more people experience involvement in
the criminal legal system at a low level.50 Even those con-
victed of misdemeanor offenses see their income decrease
by 16%.51 The economic loss from misdemeanors alone is
$240 billion annually, and when one factors in felonies, the
figure rises to $370 billion.52 These numbers represent more
than mere lost aggregate economic potential—lost wages
translate into an inability to spend, save, or invest that has
a generational impact, holding back not only the convicted
person but her family as well.53
Layered over all of these problems is the criminal legal
system’s disparate impact on racial minorities and those in
poverty. Black and Latinx individuals represent more than
half of those sent to prison (and, by extension, more than
half of those facing the most severe economic and other
collateral consequences).54 But the problem of disparate
outcomes is not explained by disparities in the pipeline to
prison; Black and Latinx people see greater gaps in lifetime
earnings based on their past imprisonment than socioeco-
nomically similar whites.55 Racial minorities are both more
likely to be swept into the system in the first place and to
suffer more severe consequences once institutionalized.56
Over 70 million Americans have a criminal record at
some level.57 Some estimates place the number higher
still—as early as 2014, the FBI master criminal database
contained 77.7 million names and counting, with the
number rising by 10,000 to 12,000 each day.58 Being
charged with a misdemeanor is roughly as common as
attending a four-year college. These millions of individuals
swept up in the system—including the Brennan Center’s
estimate of almost 20 million with a felony conviction and
45 million convicted of misdemeanor offenses—suffer
ongoing consequences beyond fines, probation, and jail or
prison time.59
IV. Drafting Judges to “Pardon” in the Era of Mass
Conviction
Our federal judiciary is uniquely situated to act as a large-scale
auxiliary to the president’s pardon power. It has the capacity,
infrastructure, and expertise to implement a program to
restore rights to the hundreds of thousands of law-abiding
and productive individuals living with the consequences of
federal convictions. It is high time that Congress harnessed
this capability in a formalized legislative scheme.
Simply from a personnel standpoint, there are 677 dis-
trict court judges, supported by 541 magistrate judges, and
thousands of judicial clerks, probation officers, prosecutors,
and defense lawyers.60 By contrast, as the Office of the
Inspector General reported, President Obama’s adminis-
tration deployed what it could—the relatively skeletal staff
of twenty-two in the Office of the Pardon Attorney, sup-
plemented by volunteer part-time lawyers from other
Department of Justice units and ten full-time lawyers
detailed in April 2016—to make recommendations on
approximately 13,000 petitions, with some taking the files
home with them on weekends.61 It goes without saying that
13,000 is a drop in the ocean of potential pardon applica-
tions, which are arguably more complex than commutation
petitions. It is not hard to commute a life sentence today
when, under today’s laws, such a sentence would be sig-
nificantly lower. It is quite another to make the determi-
nation that someone who has not been under any kind of
criminal supervision for years is fully rehabilitated.
Moreover, the kind of systematic, in-depth, individu-
alized analysis required by this process is precisely what
judges do. Judge John Gleeson’s 2016 decision in United
States v. Doe,62 in which he devised a unique mechanism
to certify an individual’s post-sentence rehabilitation, is
a case in point.
Doe, a licensed nurse, moved to expunge a thirteen-year-
old fraud conviction unrelated to her employment as
a nurse that was inhibiting her from obtaining work in her
field. Her post-sentence employment experience was
emblematic of so many with federal convictions. Because
her conviction appeared in databases and on her nursing
license, numerous employers refused to hire her or
rescinded job offers shortly after they had been made.63
Although her “probation file reveal[ed] a woman who very
much wanted to work,” she was forced to make ends meet
by running a house-cleaning business and relying on the
support of family members.64 She lived day to day, unable
to invest in her own and her children’s future.65
Denying her motion to expunge because her situation
did not amount to “extreme circumstances” warranting that
relief, the judge noted that, in any event, expungement
would not have given her the relief she sought, as the
conviction would remain on her nursing license and on
private databases.66 Indeed, this is why, in the digital age,
expungement or record sealing (the so-called “forgetting
model” of addressing collateral consequences)67 is not the
optimal solution to the adverse effects of a criminal con-
viction, in the absence of robust regulations to prevent any
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reliance on such conviction.68 (Months later, in another of
Judge Gleeson’s cases, the Second Circuit ruled that federal
judges do not have the power to expunge an individual’s
criminal conviction.)69
Instead, Judge Gleeson granted Doe a “Federal Certifi-
cate of Rehabilitation,” a remedy he modeled on the well-
established New York State system of offering a Certificate
of Relief from Disabilities (available on the date of sen-
tencing to someone with only one felony) and a Certificate
of Good Conduct (available to people with more than one
felony after a period of good conduct). Critically, both
operate to “create a legally enforceable presumption of
rehabilitation that ‘shall not cause automatic forfeiture of
any license . . . right or privilege’ under state law, such as the
right to vote, subject to some exceptions.”70 Doe’s federal
certificate did not immediately grant her any legal relief.
But because it had been signed by the Chief Probation
Officer of the district, it would carry a legal presumption
that the state agency tasked with issuing these certificates
would grant her one.71
The certificate of rehabilitation operationalizes the
“forgiveness model”72 of remedying collateral conse-
quences of convictions. Given the focus of this essay, we
could call it the pardon model. It is a public affirmation that
the criminal legal system that accused, convicted, and
punished an individual now believes that they deserve the
right to move on and be fully embraced as co-equal citizens:
“[T]he same court that held Doe accountable for her crim-
inal acts has now concluded after careful scrutiny . . . that
she be welcomed to participate in society in the ways the
rest of us do.”73
As Judge Gleeson made clear in the decision, this was
a labor-intensive (“painstaking”)74 process:
Most prospective employers do not have the time or
resources to gain a comprehensive understanding of
who Doe is, and then to figure out what weight, if
any, her conviction should play in the hiring process.
So I have done that for them. I have reviewed each page
of Doe’s trial transcript, presentence report, probation
reports, deposition transcript, and other documents she
and the government provided to me for a holistic view of
her character and competency today. I find that there is
no relationship between Doe’s conviction and her
fitness to be a nurse.75
The formal process to evaluate an application for
a presidential pardon is no less time-consuming.76 But
a judicial restoration-of-rights procedure has multiple
advantages over the pardon process. First, and most obvi-
ously, as noted above, drafting the entire federal judiciary in
this enterprise creates the potential for relief to hundreds of
thousands of people over time. Indeed, as in Doe, many
judges will already be intimately familiar with the petitioner
and their prior criminal conduct, and thus have a head start
in the decision-making process.77 In addition, the fact-
finding process in open court is more transparent and
subject to adversarial testing, thus encouraging and leading
to greater accuracy. It also makes the entire process more
accountable for all concerned, including victims. Moreover,
this open judicial process will involve deadlines, providing
a level of certainty and security that current pardon appli-
cants (some with applications languishing for years) have
never experienced.78
Another significant advantage the federal system has
over the pardon process is that our federal courts are well
equipped to systematize the adjudication of petitions, as
they did in recent years with tens of thousands of petitions
for sentencing reductions under changes made by Con-
gress, the Supreme Court, and the Sentencing Commis-
sion. As Supreme Court Fellow Caryn Devins concluded in
her rich empirical study on the implementation of retro-
active federal drug guideline changes, stakeholders
reported that it was, “for the most part, smooth and
orderly,” with judges often working with “probation officers
and representatives from the U.S. Attorney’s Office and
federal defender organizations in order to create expedited
sentencing processes.”79 A restoration-of-rights process is
similarly well suited to systematization, potentially with
committees of probation officers, prosecutors, and defense
lawyers making recommendations to the district judges,
thus creating a streamlined pathway to relief for the most
deserving of individuals, and identifying the petitions that
are premature or need to be litigated.80
Although there is currently no procedure for the resto-
ration of rights at the federal level (outside the pardon
process), a bipartisan bill was introduced in the last con-
gressional session—the Recognizing Education, Employ-
ment, New Skills, and Treatment to Enable Reintegration
(RE-ENTER) Act—which would allow federal judges to
issue a “Certificate of Rehabilitation” to acknowledge an
eligible offender who has successfully reintegrated into
society.81 A full analysis of this bill is outside the scope of
this essay, but in short, the proposed legislation aims to
provide recipients of these certificates with a tool that
removes barriers to housing and employment.82 Other
proposals for relief have been presented by the Uniform
Law Commission and by the American Law Institute
through its amended Model Penal Code.83 There is no
shortage of proposals and guidance.84
Importantly, any legislative scheme to restore rights will
not supplant the pardon process. Rather, it is, in a sense, an
advance team. It can analyze far more cases than the
Department of Justice can do, and dispatch undeserving
cases quickly. It can grant relief that might suffice for the
party in question, without the need for any additional relief
conferred by a pardon (such as protection from deporta-
tion). Where a judge refuses relief, the litigated position is
now joined, and the issues simplified for the pardon
decision-makers. It makes the pardon process a backstop
(as was intended) rather than the first port of call.85
V. Conclusion
In announcing his comprehensive governmental approach
to “advancing equity for all, including people of color and
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others who have been historically underserved, marginal-
ized, and adversely affected by persistent poverty and
inequality,” President Biden acknowledged the deep and
interlocking forces that undermine the “equal opportunity”
that is the “bedrock of our democracy.”86 As the Brennan
Center’s recent report on the devastating long-term eco-
nomic consequences of criminal convictions, particularly
for racial minorities, has spotlighted, one of the drivers of
inequity is post-sentence collateral consequences.
Neither clemency nor expungement, however, is the
answer. The task of restoring rights to the millions affected
is too great for one executive. Moreover, in the digital age,
sealing of criminal records is an illusory fix because it is the
rare instance where some evidence of an individual’s crim-
inal history cannot be found online.87 Rather, the most
effective way is a formalized system whereby someone with
a prior conviction can obtain an affirmative certification of
their rehabilitation and fitness to rejoin society. The states
have been implementing these schemes for decades. It is
time for the federal system to implement one too.88 Such
certificates must be coupled with clear prohibitions on
considering criminal records in all the areas where these
convictions relegate people to a second-class status.
Finally, a welcome byproduct of entrusting the role of
restoring rights to judges is that they—and other practi-
tioners in the criminal legal system—get to see sentenced
individuals in a fresh and positive light, in their newly
constituted productive lives. All of us working in the
criminal legal system need constant reminders that human
beings should not be defined by their worst decisions.
Despite their transgressions, defendants in our criminal
legal system have agency and can change, absorbing les-
sons learned and thereby adapting to be better citizens. We
too, as a society, can change—similarly absorbing lessons
learned from experience and social science, so that we can,
as a nation, fulfill our Founders’ vison of an enlightened
polity that recognizes “the rigor[s] of [its] law” and avoids
a justice system that is “too sanguinary and cruel.”89
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